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VIETNAM REPORT

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COUNTRY REPORTED SEEKING TO BREAK OUT OF ISOLATION

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 24 Jun 82 p 19

[Article by Alain Cass]

[Text]

THE wards of No. 2 children's hospital in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) are full of children on the edge of starvation. Half of them belong to Vietnamese government officials.

A few children have cots to themselves, most sleep two or three to a bed. They are the lucky ones. Others lie in the corridors, curled up on the tiled floors, sometimes tended by their parents, alone if they are orphans.

The doctors who care for them with such devotion are able to save 90 per cent, a remarkable feat given the lack of drugs, proper equipment and food.

In the hospital's research unit the success rate is even higher. There Dr Hoa, a nutritionist, leans down and picks up a child disfigured by hunger, gently, as if rescuing a wounded sparrow.

"This little girl is two years old," she says. "She weighs 3.63 kg (8 lb) and is doing quite well. She is the daughter of a party member."

Dependent

She adds: "After 30 years of war Vietnam is still at war and 45 per cent of our people do not have enough to eat. We are being bled white and we cannot go on like this." Our situation is "in-vivable," she says, using the French word, which

conveys even less hope than "intolerable," its nearest English equivalent.

Whether Vietnam is, as Dr Hoa implies, close to breaking point is far from clear. But seven years after the capture of Saigon, it is still fighting on several fronts.

In Kampuchea it has over 150,000 troops deployed throughout the country, battling the remnants of the Chinese-backed former Khmer Rouge regime of Pol Pot. Another 40,000 troops are fighting anti-Communist insurgents in Laos. Five times that number are tied down in sporadic skirmishes on the Chinese border. Others are pursuing a dwindling band of South Vietnamese irregulars still holding out in the Central Highlands.

Added to this are the battles against poverty, corruption and maladministration. This is especially true in the South, where Hanoi's attempts to impose socialism have failed utterly.

The outcome of these many and overlapping battles obviously matters to Vietnam. But it is also important for South-East Asia. The long-term stability of the region cannot be taken for granted while Vietnam remains at odds with itself and its neighbours, increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and

at loggerheads with China and the US.

The border conflict with China could erupt into full-scale war, as it did in 1979, carrying with it the risks of a wider clash with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the war of attrition in Kampuchea casts a lengthening shadow over the more prosperous non-Communist states of South-East Asia such as Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore.

Dr Hoa was Minister of Health in South Vietnam's provisional revolutionary government during the long years of war which ended in defeat for the US in 1975. She later resigned, the only minister to do so, and left the Communist Party, although she will not talk about this. All she says is: "This is where I am most useful."

Her past links with the ageing leadership in Hanoi endow Dr Hoa's views with special value as well as allowing her to survive. "There's a whole hierarchy," she explains, "which has less to do with Communism than with the ancient Vietnamese feudalism. Things go slowly. That's part of the problem."

The only hope, she adds, is that going "from failure to failure we will learn. We are very practical, you know, very realistic."

The recent fifth party congress at the end of March provided dramatic evidence of this realism. Speeches by Pham Van Dong, Vietnam's Prime Minister for over 30 years, and Le Duc Tho, twin architect with Dr Henry Kissinger of the 1973 Paris peace accords, were remarkably frank about the party's shortcomings.

A number of senior Politburo members were replaced in the first such full-scale clean out for years while radical new policies injecting significant doses of the free market into Vietnam's moribund state-controlled economy were endorsed. The Congress represented perhaps the fullest admission of failure ever made by a Communist Party when in power.

There is no need to go far in Ho Chi Minh City to see why. It is slowly decaying and, short of a major rescue operation, may be beyond salvation. In the port, opposite the Majestic Hotel, the rotting hulks of small freighters going nowhere slowly succumb to the intense humidity.

In the streets around, a few people make pathetic attempts to restore their

houses, but mostly they are left untouched. The city's industries, once the power-house of South Vietnam, work a three-day week because of electricity shortages.

At night hundreds of pavement-dwellers, people with no houses, sleep in rat-infested streets reminiscent of Calcutta. Everything is scarce: food, drugs, petrol, spare parts, jobs. There are no reliable unemployment statistics but by day the streets are full of young people cycling to and fro.

Exodus

Le Quang Chan, deputy chairman of the People's Committee, maintains: "Most Vietnamese in the South want to build socialism." But that is far from obvious.

Cholon, the Chinese district, is a hive of black market activity. Smuggled whisky, tape recorders, Japanese TV sets, watches, even pilfered drugs bound for Kampuchea, are packed tightly on hundreds of stalls.

In the seven years since 1975 over one million people are estimated to have fled from Vietnam or died in the attempt — a massive haemorrhage of talent and expertise. The exodus continues but the rate has recently dropped, partly because of the officially-sanctioned Orderly Departure Programme and partly because coastal defences against the "Boat People" have been strengthened.

"Most people would leave if they could," one is often told. There is no way of knowing if this is true. But if a foreigner is approached once, he is approached a dozen times by strangers with relatives in "re-education camps," wanting to get a message to someone abroad or just wanting to talk.

Saddest of all are the tens of thousands of GI children, the so-called Amerasians, many of whom crowd hotel entrances pressing peanuts and jasmine flowers on foreigners and repeating: "I am American, I am American."

In the countryside, collectivisation has withered on the vine. Most farms in the South are still in private hands, albeit within the framework of loose co-operatives.

At the present rate it will take Hanoi a generation — perhaps two — to integrate the South. The unpalatable truth is that the authorities are regarded as strangers in a country they shed blood to "liberate." It is, as one foreigner observed, a case of unrequited love.

Industry

Hanoi's problems in the North are different, but no less serious. Three decades of war, the continuing military burden and economic embargoes by the US and China have brought the economy virtually to its knees.

Per capita annual income for the country as a whole, according to the IMF, has fallen from US\$241 in 1976 to US\$153 last year. Even these figures appear high to most observers.

Industry, such as it is, operates at 35-40 per cent capacity because of lack of spare parts and economic knowhow, and power shortages. The country's infrastructure is in a pitiful state, which is not surprising since virtually nothing has been built for 35 years. Roads, bridges, rolling stock, trucks are held together by endless tinkering and ingenuity.

Shock

The Vietnamese economy is kept afloat by foreign aid, mostly from the Eastern bloc. Lately however, much of this has been swallowed up either by the war in Kampuchea or the yawning trade gap. Total foreign debt now stands at US\$3.5 billion while foreign reserves, as of March 1, stood at zero. An IMF team is due in Hanoi this month to discuss an emergency loan request.

Vietnam's problems do not end there. The failure so far to find oil — underlined last year by the withdrawal of three Western oil companies — has been a bitter disappointment. The Soviet Union continues the search, while supplying Hanoi with 1.6 million tonnes of oil a year. Last year, however, it tripled the price.

The Russians, with their own economic problems, have also been steadily reducing food-grain supplies. Last year this was offset by a record harvest in Vietnam, thanks partly to a good monsoon but also to new incentive measures which have boosted production. Vietnam is still some way from being able to feed itself but the improvement has come as a badly-needed morale booster, after two successive years of shortages and food riots.

The combined shock of these problems appears to have prompted a new departure in Vietnam's foreign policy, aimed at breaking out of its isolation. In the past three months Hanoi has put out feelers to the West for aid. It is also trying to reschedule its debts. Allied to this is the faintest glimmer of compromise.

over demands for the withdrawal of its troops in Kampuchea, a step which Hanoi now realises is inextricably linked to the renewed flow of aid from most Western countries.

Tolerable

Weakened by hunger, war and external pressure, Vietnam is showing, for the first time, a grudging desire for compromise. It is not, however, about to run up the white flag.

The West tends to forget what is intolerable to a European may be perfectly tolerable to a long-suffering Vietnamese who has seen far worse.

Above all, however, Vietnam's apparent desire for an accommodation with its neighbours must be seen in the context of the leadership's paramount objectives since the 1940s. The first was to recapture the South, the second to shape a bloc of Indo-chinese states, including Laos and Kampuchea, and thus ensure the security and primacy of Vietnam which, at its narrowest point, is barely 115 km (70 miles) wide.

Both these aims have been achieved, though not consolidated, at the cost of millions of lives. A complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops either from Kampuchea or Laos is, therefore, most unlikely at this stage. That will only happen when both countries are firmly under Hanoi's influence and Vietnam is finally established as major regional power. —

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

BEIRUT BOMBING DENOUNCED--Hanoi, 28 Jul (VNA)--The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV] strongly condemns the genocidal crimes of the Israeli Zionists, and demands that they immediately stop bombing and shelling Beirut, immediately and unconditionally withdraw their troops from Lebanon, and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, said a statement issued by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry today. After recalling the savage crimes committed by the Israeli aggressors against densely populated quarters in Beirut during the last six days, the statement said: The criminal acts of Israel were intended to oppose the staunch fight of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples in Beirut and force them to accept a solution beneficial to the United States and Israel. The people and the government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam express their profound admiration for the spirit of indomitable and courageous struggle of the Palestinian people and combatants, and of the Lebanese people in western Beirut and in other battlefields in Lebanon. The people and the government of the SRV affirm their militant solidarity and unswerving support for the just and surely victorious struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, and believe that this struggle, despite many difficulties ahead, will be crowned with glorious victory. [Text] [OW281852 Hanoi VNA in English 1628 GMT 28 Jul 82]

CSO: 4220/262

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

ECONOMIC OPTIONS OF FIFTH CONGRESS EXPLAINED

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Vol 18, No 6, 1982 pp 14-17

[Article by Nguyen Khac Vien: "The Economic Options of the 5th Congress"]

[Text]

For the general public the important changes which took place in leading circles tended to mask the significance of the Congress reports which define the general line and the options chosen for the 80's — a crucial period both for the Party and the nation as a whole.

For those who have closely followed the socio-political development of Vietnam, the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam was indeed the great event of recent years, as much in its preparation as its unfolding. One might say that preparation for the Congress began at the end of 1979 with the important resolution of the Central Committee's 6th Plenum which resulted in considerable changes in economic policy. Heated discussions on many topics took place, inside the Party and all over the country, coupled with real experimentation in different regions and organizations on how to run economic enterprises.

These discussions came to a head during the months preceding the Congress and, thanks to them, important amendments were made to the draft political report presented to grassroots Party organizations.

It can be said that the political report, along with the other two reports on economic development and Party organization, are a true expression of grassroots ideas and proposals. All foreign observers remarked upon the severity of the Central Committee's self-criticism at the Congress. The unity of views which emerged at the Congress around the various reports is in no way a rubber stamp, but reflects the outcome of an intense political process, which saw the confrontation of many differing opinions during the course of wide-ranging discussions. The grassroots played an active role, taking initiatives and experimenting with novel management procedures, and also in its frank criticism of the leadership.

As a result, Party members now have practical texts on which to base their activities throughout the '80s.

Two Aspects of a Complex Balance-sheet

As a prerequisite for any future advance, we must draw up a balance-sheet for the preceding period, 1976-81. A period studded with im-

portant events which occurred in an exceptionally complex international situation. It thus comes as no surprise that the discussions on the various aspects of this balance-sheet were particularly heated, and that agreement was only reached after protracted argument.

The balance-sheet presents two aspects: important advances alongside serious shortcomings and mistakes.

Like many third-world countries, Vietnam faces countless problems in its economic and cultural development: a high population growth rate, technological backwardness, lack of capital, a problematic food situation; these difficulties are compounded by the appalling consequences of 3 decades of war. One of the mistakes made in 1975-76 was to underestimate the scale of the war damage: material destruction, social upheavals, long-term effects of the massive spraying of defoliants, the psychological impact of American intervention.

Another error in 1976 was to underestimate the aggressive intentions of the China — US alliance. Repeated aggression and military provocations by Pol Pot, and later China, economic sabotage on a large scale perpetrated by a double — Chinese and American — subversive network created further burdens for Vietnam's economy and society.

Managing to resist all these pressures and aggression whilst avoiding famine and epidemics following widespread natural calamities; maintaining order and security; saving the fraternal Kampuchean people from genocide and giving them all-round aid; helping Laos in defence and economic and cultural development; taking big steps nationwide in cultural and medico-sanitary fields; preventing the spread of social evils — prostitution, pimping, drugs — left by the old regime in the South; increasing the cultivated area by 2 million hectares by developing irrigation and breaking new

ground; restoring nearly all industrial, road and rail installations destroyed during the war and laying new industrial foundations — no impartial observer could deny these achievements which were made under extremely difficult circumstances.

The decision to quickly reunify the country under one administration and government right from the end of 1976 was particularly clear-sighted; one can scarcely imagine how Vietnam would have overcome all the trials of recent years if it had had two separate governments, north and south. Firmly choosing the socialist path for the whole country has allowed us to think in the long term with a clear perspective, without which we would only have been able to patch things up without far-reaching effects.

National union is still a firm foundation: there is dissatisfaction and disagreement on many things but not on the general line: the defence of national independence and the building of socialism. The rallying of the once hostile Catholic Church and the unification of the different Buddhist sects into a Sangha (Church) which is part of national union; Beijing's failure to stir up revolt among the minority peoples in the border areas, all this shows the strength of the regime, based on a general consensus which allows for widely differing opinions on specific problems. Those who hoped for political opposition to destabilise the regime have backed the wrong horse. Our enemies know this and have now turned to economic and cultural sabotage or armed provocations.

The Vietnamese people, together with the Communist Party, will never be thrown off course.

*
* *

But it's a difficult, even tortuous, course. The Congress also provided an opportunity to make an in-

depth analysis of the shortcomings and mistakes of the previous stage. Faced with a high population growth rate, the increase in production and productivity have not had the anticipated results, in spite of important investments. Provisions for towns and some rural areas hit by natural disasters are still in jeopardy, a severe shortage of consumer articles is the cause of trafficking and a disturbing rise in prices. The import-export imbalance is obvious while savings are virtually nonexistent. Many enterprises are marking time, hardly making use of their equipment, which is often very modern, because they lack raw materials, energy and spare parts.

The Fifth Congress has identified the two major causes lying at the root of the country's problems:

- subjectivism and hastiness;
- the system of administrative, bureaucratic management.

Subjectivism and hastiness, summed up in the slogan "advance rapidly, forcefully, with determined strides", have resulted in excessive investment in far too ambitious projects with the aim of rapidly developing heavy industry, and this when the country was hardly back on its feet after the war, with an inadequate energy and transport network and completely inexperienced managerial and planning cadres, and while the population still lacked many essential commodities. The result is that these investments have not yet brought any tangible results, while shortages have been getting worse, the population has increased, and foreign aid, considerable during the war, has been cut off.

Hastiness in agriculture led to ill-considered increases in the size of co-operatives in the North, and to accelerated collectivisation in the South. This caused disenchantment amongst the peasantry and led to a drop in production. Similar voluntarism led many cadres to neglect and even curb small-scale household production based mainly around

private ponds and plots. As far as handicrafts, small industry and petty trade were concerned, the trend was to abolish them as soon as possible to move towards "large-scale socialist production". Important economic resources were neutralized in this way, thus worsening the shortages of goods and services.

The system of economic management was established in the 60's to cope with a relatively simple economic structure, with few industries in the North, entirely devoted to the war effort, and with foreign aid covering most expenditure. In this situation, the peasants did not really sell their produce to the State, but delivered it as a patriotic duty in exchange for which the State provided them with a number of industrial products, mostly from foreign aid. As a result, in both home and foreign trade, prices did not reflect the true value of commodities. Everything was supervised by the central State authority which drew up

plans, provided enterprises with equipment and raw materials, then collected the products with prices and wages set centrally. The private sector was insignificant compared to the State sector. A free market existed, but had no real economic weight. In this situation of a poor country geared up for an almost superhuman war effort, wages were distributed on a somewhat egalitarian basis, a spirit of self-sacrifice prevailed.

In the excitement of victory — the scope of which came rather unexpectedly — we rather lost sight of realities. Everything seemed possible and close at hand. Then came the great trials of 1977-79 — repeated natural calamities, Pol Pot's aggression, the Chinese invasion — requiring immediate and total attention. It was only in 1979, after having got rid of the Pol Pot threat and successfully resisted Chinese aggression, that we were able to turn our attention to the country's economic problems.

In late 1979 the 6th Plenum of the Central Committee published an important resolution, which aimed to correct a number of points of economic policy. This was later complemented by governmental decrees which clarified the new policies in a number of areas. The green light was given to many localities, towns and enterprises to conduct genuine experimentation in production and distribution. Ho Chi Minh City, Haiphong, Long An province to name but the most striking, sought to introduce new management procedures.

The economic policies adopted by the Fifth Congress confirmed the decisions taken since the 6th plenum in mid 1979, and were adopted after examination of the failures and successes of the period 1976-81. The new options will remain valid throughout the '80s.

Economic Tasks in the '80s

It can be said that the economic policy of the Fifth Congress is more balanced than that of the Fourth Congress, because it takes the real situation more into account. In the years 1976-80, the emphasis was on pressing ahead and rapidly developing the material and technical infrastructure of large-scale socialist production. Now, the political report stresses as top priority the aim to satisfy the essential needs of the population, whose living standards have been greatly reduced as a result of the war and rising prices. The building of a socialist infrastructure is conditioned by the development of agriculture, of consumer goods production and exports, the key factors for the future development of heavy industry. For the time being we shall concentrate on finishing the projects we have begun, and will refrain from investing too much in further heavy industry projects. We shall continue with the transformation of socio-economic structures in the South, but at a more gradual and more effective pace.

Agriculture, light industry (including handicrafts), and heavy industry will be integrated into a balanced economic structure. Family planning, which up till now was practised only in the wider context of medico-sanitary activities, is now given priority status in the political report. The population growth rate, which presently exceeds 2%, must be brought down to 1.7%. In practice many towns and communes have already achieved this rate after several years of active campaigning. We must now extend this to the whole country. Emphasis is also placed on developing the communications network, which was badly hit during the war, and which in the North remains very inadequate.

Investments in agriculture will be focused on the deltas of the Red and Mekong rivers, the country's two granaries, which also produce most of the country's pork, poultry and fresh-water fish. The main industrial crops to be developed are rubber, coffee, tea, concentrated in the Central Highlands and

Eastern Nam Bo, Southern Vietnam proper. The target for 1985 is 19-20 million tonnes of food, including 16 million tonnes of paddy and the rest in dry crops. Soya bean cultivation will be particularly stressed in the years to come. Special attention will be paid to protecting the forests and afforestation (300,000 ha by 1985).

Light industry, small industry and handicrafts, which produce consumer goods and a large proportion of exports, will be primarily based in the cities: Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Haiphong, Da Nang. Ho Chi Minh City, with its numerous installations and its large qualified workforce, is already the country's leading export and light industry centre. The growth of small industry and handicrafts has cut back the city's unemployment. The villages can also take over a substantial pro-

portion of handicrafts, and the northern agricultural co-operatives now also manage large workshops. The 1985 targets are as follows:

— 380 to 400 million metres of fabrics

— 90 to 100,000 tonnes of paper

— 350 to 400,000 tonnes of sugar

Stress is also laid on the production of bicycles and spare parts.

In heavy industry, the main priority is the energy supply. Three large power stations are being built with Soviet aid: the thermo-power plant at Pha Lai (600,000 kW), the hydro-electric schemes on the Da river (2 million kW) and Tri An (320,000 kW). When they come into operation in the '80s they will triple the country's electricity supply. Large funds have been earmarked for investment into the northern collieries, which will reach an annual output of 10 million tonnes in coming years. A large oil and gas complex to tap the offshore reserves in the South to be built with Soviet aid will produce crude oil by the end of the five-year plan. Prospection for natural gas in the Red River delta is to continue.

We shall not bother with other areas, of lesser strategic importance. The State will devote overall investments of 16 to 18 billion *dong* (old prices) to basic construction during the 1981—85 plan.

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The main feature of this Congress was to make explicit the new economic options and new attitudes. In his report, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Pham Van Dong emphasized the need to: "renovate management mechanisms, increase the administrative and managerial efficiency of the various levels, create a powerful mass move-

ment (...). Our national economy at present combines several sectors of widely differing technical levels, production units on completely different scales, and with diverse institutional forms. This situation has caused serious imbalances, and instead requires dynamic management mechanisms to do away with bureaucratic centralization, conservatism, and the bureaucratic subsidy system..."

The old management mechanism confined local production units and authorities to a narrow and rigid system of regulations which left them no leeway or room for initiative. Relaxing these regulations has made it possible for many regional enterprises and authorities to buy raw materials, set wages and bonuses, and sell their produce at rates which reflect production costs and market fluctuations, instead of being rigidly fixed at the central level. Local enterprises and authorities can now also keep part of their foreign currency earnings if they increase exports, which enables them to acquire the equipment and materials they must import from abroad much more rapidly. Beforehand they had to plough

through endless bureaucracy to obtain the required authorisations, thus wasting months and even years.

The old wages system, with its egalitarian slant, made no allowance for the amount of work contributed or professional qualifications. Initiative and inventiveness were rewarded in a token fashion, and management was straight-jacketed by rigid directives from higher bodies.

The present reforms amount to a new emancipation, and the main task after the Congress will be to abolish a whole range of out-dated regulations, and to institute a new system of prices, wages, norms, management mechanisms, while developing novel economic structures.

This task is all the more complex in that it also involves emancipating small-scale agricultural, handicraft and industrial production which depend not on the State sector but on the private sector and the free market. In the past, the private economy in the North had no real weight compared to the State sector. But with its integration into the national economy, the South brought with it vast numbers of private producers: private peasants, artisans, small traders, petty capitalists. The commodities and currency controlled by this sector now weighs heavily on the national economy.

The point, is not to try and crush this sector, and eliminate it as soon as possible as some cadres once thought. Its existence is now recognised as an objective necessity throughout the transition period, and furthermore as a positive factor since it answers many of our society's needs. The essential problem is how to encourage production in this sector while limiting its negative manifestations: black marketeering, trafficking, counterfeiting, contraband, prevarications, etc. The scramble for profits involving millions of small traders, private peasants and artisans, forces up prices and seriously endangers economic stability.

Thus the emancipation of small private production in no way implies a relaxation of efforts to extend the State and co-operative sectors. State-controlled trade in particular has to face severe competition to ensure sufficient purchases of important products in order to supply cheap essentials to salaried workers and civil servants, and the materials needed by export agencies.

In the agricultural co-operatives, management must take on three related tasks:

- manage the collective work of the co-operative;

- manage individually performed tasks in overall collective work;

- encourage and supervise private household production.

Under the old system, the co-operatives only dealt with collective production, while neglecting and occasionally discouraging the other types of work.

One new factor of crucial importance is the development of international co-operation, with Laos and Kampuchea, and especially with the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist community. We are not seeking foreign aid so much as promoting co-operation, involving further division of labour on an international plane. This gradual integration within the socialist community enables us to negotiate with other countries, capitalist ones in particular, without having to submit to any unacceptable preconditions. A policy of multilateral relations presupposes a firm support basis.

All these new factors which I have mentioned show that the coming period will be one of economic change, structural rather than quantitative change. A period of change not confined to new management mechanisms and new techniques, but seeking to transform prevailing mentalities, ways of thinking and of working.

Steering this new course, narrowly confined by the lasting effects of the war, population growth, technological backwardness, the Vietnamese people, led by their Communist Party, will need both cau-

tion and audacity. The emancipation of small-scale production should improve the supply of consumer goods and generate employment for millions of people, providing them with a decent livelihood. The overhaul of the wages and bonuses system along with improvements in the State retail trade should lead to a gradual increase in living standards of salaried workers. The progressive expansion of the State sector, with the assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, will eventually lead to the creation of essential industrial structures: energy, engineering, chemical in-

dustries, communications, metallurgy. It can be hoped that the first such industries will emerge in the course of the coming decade.

At the close of the '80s, Vietnam will embark upon a new stage, with the prospect of rationally exploiting its varied resources, with management mechanisms better adapted to a modern economy, with multilateral international relations based on greater integration within the world socialist community. No great leap forward, but determined steps.

On one condition: that peace is preserved.

CSO: 4220/278

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

STATE RUN ENTERPRISE RENEWS MANAGEMENT

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English 18, No 6, 1982 pp 18-21

[Article by Vu Duy Hoang: "Renovation of Management at State-Run Enterprises"]

[Text]

In the article "The Economic Options of the 5th Congress" also appearing in this issue, the author, Nguyen Khac Vien, outlines the managerial mechanism at the Vietnamese State-run enterprises applied in the period from the sixties to 1979-1980 described by the Party Congress as an "administrative subsidized mechanism of management", in other words, a mechanism whereby the State will make up for any loss a factory may incur.

This mechanism had the following characteristics: the State looked after everything, the director of the factory did not care about his or her factory's operations (procurement of raw materials and marketing). At the same time, they lost the initiative in many fields, they had no say in production planning, in pricing decisions, in the recruitment of the personnel... For their part, the workers received salaries of a heavily egalitarian character and their labour was regarded primarily as a patriotic act, a contribution to national construction and defence.

But a series of events in 1978 and 1979 made this situation untenable: US aid which ceased to come after 1975 had by then almost completely run out while in the North, China cut its aid to Vietnam.

After defeating the Chinese aggression in February 1979 Vietnam embarked upon a new peaceful period, but we now have to face a war of sabotage waged by Beijing in collusion with Washington. Meanwhile, we have to be prepared to cope with the possibility of a large-scale war by our enemies. That is why Vietnam has to discharge two tasks at the same time: to build the country and stand ready to repulse aggression — construction is the primary task as was indicated later by the 5th Party Congress.

Any observer can see that Vietnam is still in the initial stage of the period of transition to socialism. This means that while planning remains at the centre of economic construction, other factors must also be taken into account, such as market relations and merchandise-money relations.

Since 1978-1979, there have been growing limitations on the regular

supply of raw materials by the State for the normal operation of the State-run enterprises. Meanwhile, large quantities of raw materials and materials remain scattered in other sectors of society. Wide price fluctuations, chiefly upward, due to the shortage of materials and goods while wages remain almost stationary, have caused increasing difficulties for the workers.

Most of the State-run enterprises, for all their efforts, had to lower their targets many times in a year, chiefly due to raw materials and materials shortages.

Vietnam has about 2,000 industrial enterprises with a personnel of more than 600,000. However, one-third of them had to stay idle and machines operated at less than half of their capacity. Some factories had to send part of their personnel to agricultural production or to the coal mines as auxiliary work-hands. Others cut down their production rates to retain workers. In many cases production stopped altogether and workers were given 70% of their salaries during their forced idleness. Faced with ever worsening living conditions, tens of thousands of workers had to take sideline occupations or to go into commerce.

Meanwhile, the demands on industrial production and consumer goods continued to increase. So a radical change in the method of economic management was required. At this juncture, the Party Central Committee held its 6th plenum (September 1979) and issued

a resolution on expanding the production of consumer goods and of local industries, opening the way for what is known as a "boom" in production which is actually the release from the obsolete mechanism of management. New factors emerged in the economy.

So, since 1979, in all central and local enterprises two systems of production have been operating side by side, the production according to plan (with State-supplied raw materials) and the production outside the plan (without or with part of raw materials supplied by the State). This is most manifest in the enterprises with great capabilities of using materials available in the country or materials left unused in society. However, for lack of a common regulation, application of the new system varied from one place to another. Some factories took the

initiative in breaking the impediments of the old regulations, sent their employees to look out for materials themselves without waiting for State supplies as in the past. Pioneering in this direction was the Con Dao fishing enterprise (See Vietnam Courier No. 5, 1981). But not a few enterprises persisted in the old way which resulted in a further drop in production. Others took tentative steps while following the situation around and drawing lessons for themselves. After a period of supervision and study, on January 21, 1981 the Council of Ministers issued the decisions codenamed 25-CP and 26-CP.

Emergence of A New Managerial Mechanism

Decision 25-CP deals with the continued development of initiatives in production and business and financial autonomy of the State-run enterprises. Decision 26-CP deals with the system of contractual quotas payment and piece-work payment and the system of bonus in State production and business establishments. These decisions were supplemented by Decision 64-CP of February 23, 1981 on the remittance of products of State-run enterprises and the concentration of cash into the hands of the State.

These decisions form a new and relatively comprehensive system of regulations concerning management and planning in the State-run enterprises from production to marketing of products and the distribution of profits. These decisions reflect the broadening of the initiative of enterprises and businesses on the basis of ensuring the concentrated and unified management by the State and on the principle of relying mainly on planning while making appropriate use of the various laws of the market.

These decisions also aim to increase the financial autonomy of the enterprises, stimulate them to keep a closer watch over funds, equipment, materials and manpower and make use of all existing potentials to expand production, produce more for society and achieve the highest possible economic efficiency. On this basis, they are encouraged to harmoniously combine the three interests (of the State, of the collective and of individual workers), and this is primarily aimed at stimulating the workers to increase productivity, hence to increase their income and improve their living conditions.

Thus, by decision 25-CP the State encourages the enterprises not only to implement the State plan but also to manufacture extra-plan products if it has the necessary conditions in equipment and can procure other conditions such as raw materials and energy.

The plan of an enterprise comprises three parts:

The State-assigned part, with State-supplied materials and raw materials (Part A); the part produced with raw materials and materials procured by the enterprise itself (Part B) and the by-products part (Part C). The products of both Part A and Part B must be sold to State warehouses or trade service for distribution according to the State plan. The products of Part C should be sold on preferential terms to the State trade service and can be sold elsewhere only if the latter refuses to buy. In this case the enterprise is allowed to retain part of the products (not exceeding 10% of the total) as remuneration in kind to its workers. Part of the products of Part B may also be retained to exchange for necessary raw materials, materials and equipment. With regard to profits, the enterprise is entitled to more profits in Part B than in Part A and enjoys almost all profits brought about by production in Part C, remittance to the State accounting for only 15%.

Decision 25-CP also enhances the sense of responsibility and the power of the director of the enterprise. Provided they strictly observe the State plan, directors have the power to take every decision which they judge most beneficial to the economy, with regard to the use

of equipment, funds as well as manpower without having to wait for decision from above as in the past. Apart from the State-supplied fund, they may expand their enterprise's fund through the integration of profits or borrowings from the bank. They may reward or fine the workers, recruit such personnel as they deem suitable for the job, may refuse to accept any personnel sent from the higher echelon found to be unfit for the job and may appoint cadres and personnel in the framework of the common organization. Of course, they must take responsibility for errors or for failing to fulfil the State plan.

Impact on Social Life

More than one year of implementation of the above decisions has brought about positive results. In 1981, in spite of great strains in raw materials, the industrial sector on the whole fulfilled its program. The local industries, in particular, chalked up a 7-per cent increase. Considering the fact that the State could supply only half of the needed raw materials, this success clearly reflects the efforts of the enterprises to procure raw materials for themselves. The Giai Phong engineering plant in Hanoi is a case in point: As 1981 began the plant met enormous difficulties: due to the shortage of raw materials the plant could not carry out its normal operation. A large section of the workers had to stay idle. The plant's planned output value was half a million *dong* but the materials supplied by the State were valued at a little more than 90,000 *dong*. Machine tools being its main production line, to achieve a gross output value of three million *dong* under the State plan, the plant had to use hundreds of kinds of materials totalling thousands of

tons in weight. The key to a solution lay in creatively applying Decision 25-CP and giving full play to the initiative of the plant. The directorate convened a general conference of the personnel and gave them a plain picture of the situation and asked everyone to give a hand. Every force was mobilized

in the quest for raw materials and materials. The campaign involved also many relatives of the plant's workers working in other factories. Waste materials were used for the manufacture of more than 50 by-products (Part C), a thing never done before by an engineering plant.

Maximum economisation of materials was the common concern and technical measures were applied to cut down the rate of fuel and material consumption per unit of product. The plant also decided that rewards would be made proportional to the amount of materials saved. The production plan assigned by the directorate to each workshop also includes three parts:

- Part One with materials supplied by the plant,
- Part Two with materials jointly procured by the plant and the workshop,
- Part Three with materials entirely procured by the workshop.

Thus, the initiative in production and business is not confined to the plant but has been expanded to each workshop. This has enhanced the sense of mastery of each worker and paved the way for the development of production.

On the other hand, the grading of management is closely associated

	1980	1981	1982
State revenue	223,000 <i>dong</i>	548,000 <i>dong</i>	1,000,000 <i>dong</i>
The plant's revenue	135,883 »	320,000 »	700,000 »
Individual workers' income	112,560 »	220,000 »	430,000 »

with the system of piece-work payment and the system of remuneration (defined in Decision 26-CP). Thus, the workshops are vested with power to pay the workers according to the number of finished products while the non-productive sections continue to receive their monthly salaries on the basis of a fixed personnel. For instance, at the planning sections of the plant, the plan provided for a personnel of 14, but after the distribution of labour was rationalized it was found that 11 would do. As a result, these 11 persons received the salaries of 14. Bonuses are given to anyone who surpasses their production quotas. The new method of payment of salaries and bonuses and the harmonious combination of the three interests has helped the plant to ensure effective management of production and manpower. The absenteeism rate dropped markedly. There have been fewer instances of workers leaving their machines during working hours, as well as fewer sick leaves and instances of non-observance of working time because everyone has an interest in the increase of production. The income of a worker has doubled from an average of 50 *dong*.

Many earned as much as 300 *dong* and in a few special cases, even 700 *dong*.

Following is a chart of the distribution of profits at the Gial Phong plant in 1980-1982:

Like the Gial Phong plant, many other enterprises have made similar efforts to procure materials and raw materials, not only for the State plan. The Cuu Long jute carpet making factory in Ho Chi Minh City, working along the lines of Decision 25-CP, has signed contracts with many provinces in the Mekong River delta and the Can Tho University for the planting of jute in these areas instead of having to ship jute from the North (the factory consumes 27 tons of jute daily). As a result, it has been sufficiently supplied with jute, a thing never known in the previous six years. Gross output value of the factory in 1981 rose by 23.8% compared with 1980 and remittances to the State budget by two and a half times. The factory has also diversified its production lines from 4 or 5 to 21 at present. All the workers who had left the factory (they accounted for 83% of the personnel) have returned, and the factory is working at full capacity. The same situation is happening in the Tran Hung Dao engineering plant and the Mechanical Engineering Plant No. 1, both in Hanoi.

Deviations and Rectifications

However, Decision 25-CP has a number of loopholes which allowed for some deviations in its application.

— Often there has been an unclear delineation between the various parts of the plan in an enterprise so that materials originally intended for Part A were detracted for Parts B and C (which give

the plant and the workers bigger benefits than Part A).

— Failure to remit to the State the volume of products assigned under plan and a tendency to retain more products for the plant than allowed by State regulations.

— There has also been too big a gap between the incomes of various enterprises (resulting from the disparity of two different sets of prices of the same product, when sold to the State and to the free market).

These deviations and loopholes are being remedied as can be seen in the following:

Unified planning

On the principle of the unification of planning, the plan of an enterprise, including Part A, Part B and Part C, after being drawn up by the enterprise, must necessarily go to higher authorities for adoption.

The question of materials

The enterprise is allowed to procure, in addition to the materials supplied by the State, additional materials with a view to expanding production and making fuller use of the capacity of the equipment. On the basis of a unified price system, raw materials and materials can be exchanged between the enterprises but this must be faithfully reported to the higher authorities. With regard to the materials under the monopoly of the State, no free circulation is permitted. The enterprise may purchase additional materials from the collective economic sector (co-operatives) or private sector at mutually agreeable prices (this is mostly farm produce such as tea, tobacco, jute, hemp, rush...). The State also allows the enterprise to borrow foreign exchange in order to import the necessary raw materials and equipment, and also to enter into joint ventures with other economic organizations with a view to more effective use of foreign exchange.

The marketing of products and the policy on profits.

All products of State-run enterprises, no matter from what source they come, belong to the merchandise funds of the State and the enterprise is forbidden to freely market them. In the case of by-products which are not subject to State control and which the State

trade service refuses to purchase, the enterprise may market them, then make due remittance of profits to the State. Any extra products intended for sales outside the State channel must be submitted for prior approval.

In the matter of profits, the enterprise will be duly rewarded in case of fulfilment or overfulfilment of the State plan. The reward is higher if the raw materials and materials are procured by the enterprise itself. To prevent the possibility of an enterprise netting excessively high profits due to the disparity between the State-fixed price and the free market price, the profits brought about by products of the same kind will be levelled off, irrespective of from what source of raw materials they are produced.

All these measures of remedy are contained in a resolution issued by the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee on March 5, 1982 to serve as a guideline for new decisions and policies of the Government in this respect.

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Decision 25-CP of the Vietnamese Government was issued in a rather special situation. It obviously has a temporary character. Nevertheless, it reflects the spirit of the new structure of the national economy which is taking shape. To work out such a new structure was not without difficulties given the actual conditions of Vietnam which, in spite of numerous obstacles, and a small and backward production, has opted for the path of socialist development. So, the only way is to

experiment and draw experiences in the process.

Decision 25-CP, after being rectified and amended, will together with other documents undoubtedly take the economy of Vietnam out of its present stagnation and meet the hopes raised at the 5th Party Congress held in March this year.

VU DUY HOANG

CSO: 4220/278

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

RESOLUTION OUTLINES SECURITY-RELATED TASKS FOR YOUTHS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 8 Jul 82 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Tasks for the Youth Within the Job of Maintaining Security of the Fatherland"]

[Text] The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Central Committee and Ministry of Interior have just issued a joint resolution on the tasks for youths in the job of maintaining security of the fatherland. The purpose of this resolution is to further develop the assault role of the Youth Union and young generation of the country in the job of maintaining political security and social order and security, to build a clean and strong people's public security force, to educate the young to become the new socialists and to build the Youth Union organization stronger every day.

The resolution clearly indicates that the Fifth Party Congress has set forth two strategic tasks: to build socialism successfully and to be ready to fight to strongly defend the socialist Vietnamese fatherland. To safeguard political security and social order and security is an extremely important task to be fulfilled so as to win the enemy's multifaceted war of destruction. The following tasks of the overall work must be properly carried out:

1. About education:

We must teach the young generation the communist ideal, the new situation and task of the revolution, the youths' honor and responsibility toward the fatherland and people and a way of life that is wholesome, simple and creative in labor and heroic in combat.

2. About organization:

To strengthen construction and to consolidate organization of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union within the people's public security force to make it stronger everyday. All the young combatants in this force must strive to be issued

membership cards in 1983. To pay attention to training and recommending outstanding Youth Union members for the party to consider and accept as its own members; to contribute to training cadres of the people's public security force being of good quality and capabilities and deserving being the loyal and brilliant people to continue the revolutionary work of the party.

The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union chapters of all levels must organize their members and the youths and teenagers to let them take part in building a clean and strong people's public security force, recommend the outstanding members for joining this force, actively help this force and unite and cooperate with it in carrying out the task of maintaining security and order and widely develop the movement for safeguarding security of the fatherland.

3. About coordination of action:

a. The public security organs of all levels, mostly in subwards, villages, wards, districts, municipalities and cities, must coordinate their activities with the Youth Union chapters of the same levels to organize public security assault youth units, control youth units, red flag youth units, red star teenagers units, etc. for the fulfillment of the task of maintaining security and order. Since they are the mass organizations for the safeguard of security and order, they must have their own operational rules, receive specific professional training and have the necessary procedures and policies.

b. Periodically, the Youth Union chapters and public security force of different levels must coordinate their activities with the sectors concerned, such as the army, education, culture-information, communications and transportation, labor, commerce, etc., to organize propaganda campaigns about safeguarding security and order and to show good examples in this field; strive to gradually organize the youths so that all of them receive training, have jobs and work in a useful manner for society; not allow the youths to do anything unlawful, nor to be persuaded by the enemy and bad elements to become corrupt and to violate the law; through propaganda and organizing fight the enemy's psychological war; annihilate the reactionary and decadent culture; protect the economy and socialist properties; fight bribery, speculation and smuggling; and secure good management of street traffic, public order, etc. At the same time, they must be concerned about the life and legitimate aspirations of the youths and study and guide them toward having the right views on esthetical values and national, modern and socialist fashion.

c. To step up the "Solidarity of three forces" (army-youth-public security force) movement to make it widely develop in all localities and units.

To widen the brotherhood relationships among the Communist Youth Union chapters, Vanguard Teenagers chapters and Vietnam Youth Federation chapters on the one hand and the public security and army units stationed in their localities on the other. To organize this brotherhood means to have realistic programs of action

aimed at educating and motivating each other, emulating each other to fulfill the tasks of one's unit and those of the friendly unit, helping each other to build the Youth Union organization and stepping up activities related to physical education and sports, culture, art, etc.

d. To step up the socialist emulation movement.

- The youths in the people's public security force, being engaged in the "For the security of the fatherland" emulation movement, are to carry out the six teachings of beloved Uncle Ho, to do many good things while serving the people and fatherland, to strive to train themselves in becoming the socialist Vietnam People's Public Security Force members and to actively build their force to really become a strong and effective armed force that gradually moves toward being regular and modern.

The emulation movement among the youths in the people's public security force must have the contents that are closely linked with those and standards of the emulation movement aimed at winning the titles of "Glorious young combatants" and "Heroic youths defending the fatherland" and the "Determined to win emulation" movement. All collectives and individuals having satisfied these standards could be awarded the above-mentioned emulation titles.

- For the youths who are not members of the public security force, we must widen the emulation movement aimed at winning the titles of "Glorious young combatants" and "Heroic youths defending the fatherland." Within the standards of this movement we must emphasize the task of stepping up production, fulfilling the state plan, doing one's best to practice thrift and, along with it, safeguarding political security and maintaining social order and security.

All of the young men and women, members of the Youth Union, and teenagers who have scored outstanding achievements in safeguarding security and order could be awarded the "For security of the fatherland" Medal of the Ministry of Interior and the "Brave youth" Medal of the Youth Union Central Committee and chosen as those being recommended for commendation from the state.

Every year, on 22 December, the traditional "Heroic youths defending the fatherland" Festival, a final review of the emulation will take place and commendation and awards will be issued to collectives and individuals, or perhaps there will be meetings among those people who have scored outstanding achievements or feats of arms in a given locality or from all over the country.

5598

CSO: 4209/429

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

CIRCULAR ISSUED ON BUILDING DISTRICTS

BK231512 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 22 Jul 82

[Text] The VCP Central Committee secretariat recently issued a circular directing localities to review their tasks concerning the building and strengthening of districts according to the following main guidelines:

1. In order to stabilize the district building tasks, various provincial and municipal party committees must promptly reach a decision on proposed ideas to divide and incorporate a number of districts. They must make concrete proposals to the Council of Ministers on this matter. These must be based on conditions and each locality must classify districts in accordance with the production development pattern which is aimed at combining agriculture, forestry and fisheries with industry and in accordance with the assigned task to increase grain and goods production. Central sectors must coordinate with localities in carrying out the district classification task. In this context they must conduct a preliminary review to draw experiences from previous achievements to formulate guidelines, measures and plans for this task during 1982-85.
2. Localities must formulate general and sector plans for districts and a concrete plan for each grassroot production unit. This task requires a review of previous plans for production and for improving the people's daily life at district level. In this context, each district must formulate supplementary plans to meet the immediate and long-term requirements. In implementing plans, each district must review and draw experiences from past tasks in order to be able to rely chiefly on its own capability to strive--even with normal assistance from the state--to solve the food problem and increase grain and goods production. They must also closely follow up all economic activities and relationships between sectors in districts.
3. Localities must review and draw experiences on tasks concerning the consolidation of agricultural cooperatives, state farms and forestry sites and other production establishments in order to build a base for the evaluation of district planning, expand production collectives, develop correctly the secondary family-based economy, and improve managerial organization and weak cooperatives. This requires a correct evaluation of the

application of the product-based contractual system to workers in order to develop positive phenomena and overcome shortcomings so as to draw on concrete experiences to perfect the product-based contractual system, and, at the same time, to combine the rearrangement of land and agricultural cooperativization with production planning at the district level.

4. Review efforts in creating favorable conditions for districts to actively supervise the planning of production and the people's daily life at the district level; tasks concerning the classification of management of business installations for districts; and the relationship between districts and grassroot bases and between districts, sectors, provinces and the central authorities.

5. Based on the requirements for district planning, localities must review and draw on experiences to help design measures to consolidate and build economic and technical sectors in provinces and the central level to serve the district level effectively; conduct study courses to facilitate the formulation of essential regulations on the authority and responsibility of districts, especially in balancing food and labor and in improving the barter system within and between districts as well as the investment system at the district level.

CSO: 4209/432

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

CENTRAL ENTERPRISES PRODUCE GOODS FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 7 Jul 82 p 1

[Article: "Haiphong: Many Central Enterprises Produce Goods for the Locality"]

[Text] Due to a lack of materials and raw materials, many production installations in Haiphong that are subordinate to the centrally-managed sectors do not fully exploit the capacity of their equipment and manpower, in some cases the rate of use being only 30-40 percent.

The Municipal VCP Committee and People's Committee of Haiphong advocate using the municipality's own budget to invest in a number of the above-mentioned enterprises to boost production of goods for the need of the local people and export. In its economic development plan, it has eliminated the construction projects that were found to bring about no economic results and has refused to develop new production installations if the capacity of the enterprises of the same kind, both central and local, has not yet been fully exploited. With such guidelines, the municipality has been creating favorable conditions for such local enterprises as the Export Shoes and Leather Enterprise and Tools and Equipment Enterprise to boost their production. Those enterprises that do not get enough raw materials are being reorganized. The municipality has invested capital in these factories -- Haiphong Cement Factory, Tien Phong Plastic Goods Factory, Enameled Metal and Aluminum Goods Factory and Canvas Shoes Factory -- and the above-mentioned enterprises to increase the volume of goods. Many items specifically produced by the centrally-managed factories for the locality have been used to exchange for grain and food products.

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CSO: 4209/429

AGRICULTURE

HANOI SENDS PEOPLE TO DEVELOP NEW ECONOMIC ZONES IN NORTH

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jul 82 p 2

[Article by "P.V.": "Hanoi Expands Form of Sending People to Develop New Economic Zones By Integrating With Existing Populations"]

[Text] During the past several years Hanoi has sent groups of people to develop the new economic zones. Between 1976 and 1981 the districts outside the city sent to Lam Dong 2,429 families totalling 15,770 people, including 9,920 workers, and set up two state farms and 15 cooperatives. Investment in constructing the new economic zones there amounted to 25 million dong (not including the value of equipment and machinery). Some 3,960 hectares were cleared and 2,728 hectares were brought into production. During the same period, Hanoi's new economic zones produced 6,970 tons of grain. Furthermore, each year they produced 2 tons of silkworm cocoons, 2 million bricks, 1,700 cubic meters of wood, 120 tons of pine resin, 150 tons of export goods, etc.

In 1982 Hanoi will send 410 additional families to Lam Dong. Because of many difficulties regarding capital, transportation facilities, materials, etc., the municipality is concentrating all efforts, from campaigning among the people to sending cadres to locate areas in the northern provinces, in order to expand the sending of people to develop new economic zones by means of the integration form. The districts outside the city, such as Dan Phuong, Hoai Duc, Phuc Tho, Thach That, etc., have sent many cadres to find locations and have invited many cadres from places to which they intend to send people to visit cooperatives in the lowlands. That has improved the mutual understanding between the two areas and will facilitate the sending and receiving of people in the future.

At present, some districts in the provinces of Hoang Lien Son, Vinh Phu, Son La, etc., could accept more than 300 families to develop the economy in the integration manner.

Many districts in the outskirts of the city have set up and effectively used new economic zone funds in the sphere of the district. Despite a shortage of capital, the agricultural cooperatives contributed 194,000 dong and 43 tons of grain in order to send 160 families to the new economic zones.

A new feature of Hanoi's distribution of labor and population this year is concentration on drafting a plan regarding and fully using the land in Ba Vi District that can be used for agricultural production.

Hanoi is now strengthening the apparatus carrying out that task from the municipal level down to the base level, is arranging things with the localities to which people are to be sent by signing specific contracts with the localities which will receive them, setting up a new economic zone fund, and carrying out that task in the sphere of the entire city.

5616

CSO: 4209/428

AGRICULTURE

AGRICULTURAL REVIEW DISCUSSES 10TH MONTH RICE CROP

BK221216 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 21 Jul 82

[Review of agricultural news for the past 10 days]

[Summary] "As of 15 July, northern provinces had plowed 997,000 hectares of land for the 10th-month rice crop, achieving 97 percent of plan norm or 98,000 hectares less than the same period last year. Many provinces have almost completed their plowing. One hundred and twenty one thousand hectares have been left unplowed due to the water shortage, of which 33,000 hectares are in Thai Binh Province, 21,000 hectares in Ha Nam Ninh, 20,000 hectares in Ha Bac, 12,000 hectares in Thanh Hoa and 16,000 hectares in Hai Hung."

These provinces are trying to bring more water to their ricefields by improving their irrigation systems through the integration of their electric pumps, buckets and spinning wheels. The pace of improvement, however, has been slow since the electric supply is sporadic and water sources are too far away from ricefields.

"Many localities have completed their sowing of 10th-month rice seedlings and are busily carrying out transplanting work. About 21,000 hectares of seedlings have been ravaged by harmful insects in 12 provinces, of which 4,000 hectares are in Ha Son Binh Province, 3,500 hectares in Ha Bac, 3,400 hectares in Ha Nam Ninh, 2,400 hectares in Hai Hung and 2,100 hectares in Haiphong Municipality. These localities are striving to eliminate these insects to ensure sufficient seedlings for the 10th-month crop.

"To date the country has planted 1,148,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, or 226,000 hectares less than the same period last year. There has been rainfall over the past several days and northern provinces have continued their planting work. The early 10th-month rice planting period is over, but provinces in the Bac Bo delta have planted only 137,000 hectares. Thai Binh Province planned to plant 20,000 hectares of the early 10th-month rice, but has so far planted only 7,850 hectares or 39.2 percent of its plan norm."

In general, the pace of rice planting is too slow. As a result, it is not only difficult to fulfill the plan norms for the early 10th-month rice but this will also affect the forthcoming winter rice crop. The pace of planting in provinces

of the former fourth zone, however, is quicker, with Binh Tri Thien Province achieving 85 percent of its plan norm while Nghe Tinh and Thanh Hoa provinces have scored 64.3 and 41.7 percent respectively.

About 140,000 hectares of planted ricefields are faced with a water shortage in 9 provinces of the Red River delta, the fourth zone and midlands areas, mostly in Nghe Tinh, Thanh Hoa, Hai Hung and Ha Bac provinces. "More than 16,000 hectares of rice in these provinces have been ravaged by harmful insects, mostly leaf rollers. The damage was not severe, but the insects have developed in many localities."

The 10th-month rice transplanted areas in many localities are developing satisfactorily. Cooperatives have completed their first weeding while many others are attentively caring for their ricefields. [as printed]

"Southern provinces have planted 648,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, achieving 32 percent of their plan norms. Provinces from Thuan Hai southward have planted 537,000 hectares, achieving 30 percent of plan norm, of which 493,000 hectares or 33.1 percent of the plan norm are in provinces of the Mekong River delta. The weather conditions in these provinces have been favorable, with regular rainfall, and ricefields are developing satisfactorily. From now until the end of the planting season, southern provinces must strive to plant the remaining almost 1.4 million hectares."

Concerning other crops, as of 15 July the country has planted 380,000 hectares of vegetables, subsidiary and industrial crops, or over 10,000 hectares more than the same period last year. This year's summer-fall subsidiary crop acreage is larger than last year, but it is still far from the planned target. This was due to the prolonged drought and shortage of materials and equipment.

The 10th-month rice crop is the most important crop of the year. Ensuring a successful 10th-month crop is a guarantee for the success of the forthcoming winter crop. As a result, over the next 10 days localities must concentrate their efforts on carrying out the following tasks satisfactorily:

--northern provinces must accelerate the pace of plowing to ensure a complete 10th-month rice planting. The material, water conservancy and electric sectors must provide help for production establishments, especially electric pumping stations which supply water to ricefields.

--southern provinces must strive to overfulfill their 10th-month rice planting plan norms to offset the losses in the spring and summer-fall crops. Provinces in the fifth zone must strive to fight against the drought and plant rice on all planned areas. Provinces in eastern Nam Bo must accelerate their planting work so that they will soon fulfill their plan norms.

--along with accelerating the 10th-month rice planting, localities must pay special attention to caring for vegetable, subsidiary and industrial crops, and expand hog raising to obtain more animal manure for the various crops.

--localities which have not fulfilled their grain obligation must strive to accelerate their deliveries to state granaries.

--flooding and waterlogging could occur at the end of the 10th-month crop, localities therefore must formulate plans to protect their ricefields effectively.

CSO: 4209/432

AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' ON OUTCOME OF WINTER-SPRING CROP

BK241600 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 23 Jul 82

[NHAN DAN 23 July editorial: "Foster the Success of Winter-Spring Crop Production"]

[Text] Elated at the success of the winter-spring crop, various rural areas are stepping up the planting of the 10th-month crop and are emulating in fulfilling their grain obligation or in selling more grain to the state. What is most necessary for them to do now is to draw on the experiences they have gained in planting the winter-spring crop, such as providing technical guidance and management, the organization of implementation and carrying out policies.

In this year's winter-spring crop, we have made new progress in introducing advanced technology to production. The main purposes of this were to attain the two objectives, namely exploiting natural advantages to develop the potentials of land and crops while preventing and reducing losses which might result from natural disadvantages.

The sky was overcast for a long time when the winter-spring rice was just planted. Riceplants were visibly unable to develop during the period February to April. To correct this situation production units applied the method of planting rice densely as advised by the agricultural sector and stepped up intensive cultivation more satisfactorily than in the past years. Biological measures were reported to have been applied widely through the extensive use of new high-yield rice varieties, the use of larger amounts of fertilizer, and the repeated and more extensive weeding of ricefields. When insect infestation and blight broke out--especially when rice blast posed a threat to various provinces, both in the north and the south--a widespread movement to eradicate insects and blight was quickly launched and blight was promptly brought under control. During a 50-day period toward the end of the crop season, the weather turned very favorable for riceplants to grow ears. A high rice output was reportedly harvested from those patches of ricefields planted in accordance with the seasonal schedule.

Advanced technical methods applied in production are not always effective as they depend on many direct and indirect factors, particularly on the new management mechanism with a key link being the system of giving out

contracts for end-products to groups of workers or individual workers. It is noted by those localities and establishments which have enjoyed good harvests that if management had been carried out in the old style--namely assigning contracts without specifying the quotas--the outcome of the recent winter-spring crop would not have been as good as it was, and would have faced more difficulties. It is evident that all of the intensive cultivation measures which were applied successfully in the recent winter-spring crop had been used in previous crops but they had produced poor results.

The outcome of this year's winter-spring crop testifies to the positive effect of the new contractual system and reflects efforts to perfect this system, to improve its effectiveness and to overcome step by step those negative phenomena and shortcomings which we faced in the initial stage.

A number of newly-promulgated policies that provide an incentive to production also created a positive effect, direct or indirect, on the outcome of the winter-spring crop. They include the policy on establishing grain obligations, the policy on the collection and purchase of grain under two-way contracts, and the policy on the supply of technical materials.

In general, the various sectors responsible for agricultural development have all demonstrated their efforts and a high sense of responsibility. These sectors involve technical equipment, water conservancy, electricity, communications and transportation.

The success of this year's winter-spring crop has enabled producers as well as those involved in agricultural guidance and research to become more aware of the great potential of arable land in various areas, especially in the Red River delta where land has been exploited since time immemorial. Although there is nothing special about intensive cultivation measures as compared with before and despite fewer material supplies, we have been able to attain high output from all types of croplands in many areas. The struggle to insure that each crop produces an average output of 3 tons per hectare for each province, 4 tons per hectare for each district, and 6-7 tons per hectare for each cooperative has become ever more feasible.

In addition to strong points and positive factors, a review of the recent winter-spring crop production shows us many weaknesses and shortcomings which need to be overcome in order to further advance the agricultural production movement. Rice blast broke out in many areas because some rice varieties carried the germ of the blight. Some new rice varieties such as the Nong Ngiep-8 rice variety became degraded and their output was reported to have declined to 3 tons per hectare. Meanwhile, the same rice varieties which were carefully selected and planted in other areas yielded 7-8 tons per hectare. In areas where the planting was not carried out in accordance with the seasonal schedule--planting rice too early with the use of fully-grown rice seedlings which grew ears in March--rice output was markedly low. A number of technical materials, particularly nitrogenous fertilizer and insecticide, were distributed

haphazardly in various sectors. This led to a situation in which the production sector at times suffered a critical shortage of these materials while other sectors had fertilizer piled up in their storehouses. In addition to technical problems, shortcomings in management and in the providing of guidance for and the organization of implementation contributed substantially to limiting the results of production.

The review of experiences obtained in the planting of this year's winter-spring crop, if organized quickly, carefully and practically on various aspects and in all key activities, will certainly be useful in guiding the planting of the 10th-month crop and other ensuing crops.

CSO: 4209/432

AGRICULTURE

DONG THAP, HAU GIANG COLLECT RICE FOR STATE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Jul 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Dong Thap Deposits 117,000 Tons of Paddy in State Granaries; Hau Giang Attains 90 Percent of Agricultural Tax Collection Plan Norm"]

[Text] As of 20 June 1982 Dong Thap Province had mobilized more than 117,000 tons of paddy, equivalent to more than 90 percent of its 1982 plan norm and an increase of 6.3 percent over the same period last year. Thap Muoi and Tam Nong districts and 13 villages in the province overfulfilled their 1982 grain mobilization norms by from 8 to 11 percent.

The province signed a contract with the communications-transportation sector of Ho Chi Minh City to mobilize hundreds of tons of facilities to transport paddy to the granaries and to deliver it to the central echelon, thus shipping all paddy left out-of-doors before the onset of the rainy season. Tam Nong District organized a good communication-liaison network extending from the hamlet and village level to the district level and prepared in advance cash, materials, merchandise, packaging, and transportation facilities.

By the end of May the district had mobilized 32,400 tons of paddy, thus exceeding the annual norm by 11 percent. During the winter-spring season the district mobilized more than 28,000 tons of paddy. On the average, 2.7 tons were mobilized from each hectare, the most in the province. Because it prepared materials and goods in advance, tightly managed the market during the harvest period, and severely punished people who speculated and competed with the state in buying grain, Thap Muoi District deposited more than 15,000 tons of paddy-- 8 percent more than called for by the state plan -- in the granaries.

Since the beginning of the season Hau Giang Province has attained 90 percent of the annual plan norm regarding the collection of agricultural taxes in paddy. The districts of Long Phu, Vinh Phu, Vinh Chau, and Phung Hiep, and the city of Soc Trang, are units which led the province with regard to the collection of agricultural taxes and fulfilled the plan norms assigned them.

This year the collection of agricultural taxes in Hau Giang Province was prepared, organized, and implemented more meticulously than in past years. Many localities in the province closely tied in tax collection with the harvesting schedule of each area. They visited the fields, accurately evaluated yields and output, and ensured that tax exemptions were in correct accordance with the policy and did not get out of hand, as in the past. The agricultural tax sector

sent cadres to the districts to help the bases rapidly set up and validate tax books, provide professional guidance, and inspect auditing and balancing. The localities relied on the management boards of the production collectives or production solidarity teams or the people's teams, and concentrated cadres to encourage and organize the rapid and effective delivery of grain in each collective, production solidarity team, hamlet, and village, in order to ensure that the paddy was clean and was deposited rapidly and effectively in the state granaries.

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CSO: 4209/428

AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL CALLS FOR EFFECTIVE GRAIN MOBILIZATION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Jul 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Rapidly and Effectively Mobilize Fifth Month-Spring Grain"]

[Text] This year's fifth month-spring season produced a bumper crop. The yield and output were the greatest ever for a fifth month-spring crop. Everywhere peasants have enthusiastically fulfilled their grain obligations at a more rapid rate than in previous years. As of the end of June the southern provinces had attained more than 91 percent of the grain mobilization norm for the 1981 10th month season and the 1982 winter-spring season. Most outstanding were the provinces of Tien Giang, Cuu Long, Dong Thap, An Giang, etc. In the north, within a period of one month the provinces mobilized 91 percent of the obligatory norm and nearly 80 percent of the over-all fifth month-spring mobilization norm, with a quantity 70,000 tons greater than during the same period last year. Seven provinces and municipalities, 100 districts, and 2,654 cooperatives have fulfilled their grain obligations. Nghe Tinh was the first province to fulfill its over-all grain mobilization norm. Some provinces in the Bac Bo delta and in the former Zone 4, such as Ha Nam Ninh, Hai Hung, and Thanh Hoa, after fulfilling their obligations went all-out to raise the mobilization norm above the norm that had been assigned.

Building on the accomplishments that have been attained, the localities must endeavor to rapidly and effectively complete the mobilization of the fifth month-spring grain. In the lowland provinces the paddy remaining to be mobilized is largely that beyond the obligatory amounts, exchanged for merchandise, or bought at negotiated prices. In some midlands and mountain-region provinces the requisition-purchase rate is still slow, in part because the crop is being harvested later and in part because of a lack of timely organization and guidance or because of objective difficulties regarding the preparation of material bases for requisition purchasing. The mission of every locality, village, district, and province is to continue to apply effective measures to fulfill and overfulfill the grain mobilization plan norm. They must promote both aspects of mobilization -- within the obligatory amount and beyond the obligatory amount -- and pay all-out attention to fully collecting taxes and debts and fairly settling two-way contracts. Places which have completed the mobilization of the obligatory amounts of grain must concentrate on purchasing grain beyond the obligatory amounts. The grain sector is responsible for coordinating with the relevant sectors to monitor the materials and goods distributed to the necessary places to exchange with or

sell to the cooperatives and the peasants in appropriate forms which are in accord with the principles stipulated by the state, especially those regarding price guidelines and exchange price ratios.

The management of the grain market must be further strengthened in order to eliminate and resolutely punish acts of speculation and hoarding, and ensure that the grain sector exercises unified management of requisition purchasing and centralize grain and merchandise in the hands of the state.

Accelerating the requisition-purchasing rate and fulfilling the over-all grain mobilization norm for the fifth month-spring season is a key, immediate mission of the localities on the basis of which they must advance to fulfilling the annual grain mobilization plan.

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CSO: 4209/428

AGRICULTURE

ABOUT GROWING FLOATING RICE IN THE MEKONG RIVER DELTA

Hanoi KHOA HOC VA KY THUAT NONG NGHIEP in Vietnamese No 6, Jun 82
pp 243-246

[Article by Nguyen Xuan Hien: "Floating Rice in the Mekong River Delta"]

[Excerpts] Since farmers in the floating rice-growing zone still grow the long-term local rice varieties and still apply rather simple cultivation techniques (giving no care to rice plants after planting and only waiting for harvest time to come), which greatly depend on nature, the crop yield remains uncertain and hardly exceeds 15-16 quintals/hectare. However, wherever the water conservancy conditions have been improved in order to apply the progressive techniques in connection with soil improvement, cultivation procedures, seeds, etc. and, henceforth, to switch to growing two rice crops or one rice crop and one subsidiary food crop (soybean, sesame, watermelon, etc.) crop yield, output and income all are obviously increased and the living standard and environment of farmers also show fast changes. It is practically possible to raise the rice crop yield here to 30-40 quintals/hectare and if the water conservancy conditions are good, it is possible to obtain 70-80 quintals/hectare of grain a year. As compared with other agricultural zones in the Mekong River delta, the floating rice-growing zone can easily raise crop yield without having to invest too much.

Ecological Environment

Floating rice is being widely grown in the Long Xuyen quadrangle and Dong Thap Muoi.

The Long Xuyen quadrangle, a typical floating rice-growing zone, is the lowest land in the Mekong River delta and looks like a valley surrounded by the mountain ranges of That Son, Thoai Son (in An Giang Province) and Ha Tien (in Kien Giang Province), with some mountains being as high as 500-600 meters and a number of hills around Tinh Bien (in An Giang) being about 200 meters high; its total natural area is about 340,000 hectares, with only nearly 120,000 hectares being used for crop growing.

Dong Thap Muoi has a larger natural area (about 550,000 hectares, but only about 270,000 hectares being used for crop growing). It is a zone of low land, under water almost year-round and one of the higher alkaline concentration zones in the Mekong River delta.

Application of technical measures appropriate for improvement. Because of the hydrogeological conditions of the floating rice-growing zone the technical measures for improvement have not yet been widely applied. In the immediate time to come, this set of measures must help to create favorable conditions for rice plants to grow strongly before the arrival of flood water so as to provide them with a great ability to reach above the water surface; on the other hand, after the water level does not rise any more, conditions must be created for them to develop strong stems, large ears and firm grains; as the rice is ripe, it is necessary to harvest quickly and neatly so as to reduce the excessive losses that now exist.

As to the soil preparation schedule and technique, try to plow early so as to let the soil become dry and aerated for 15-30 days and then plow and harrow again to break the soil even more. To fight birds, rats, grasshoppers and weeds prior to the arrival of flood water helps to ensure density and to raise crop yield. Density of rice plants can be increased in a reasonable manner. We can use about 20 kilograms of urea per hectare to fertilize rice plants right after the arrival of flood water to make them strong and more capable of reaching above the water level and at the time the water level ceases to rise and begins to recede, apply the same amount of urea to help rice plants to grow strongly and to develop large ears. This way of fertilizing can boost crop yield by about 20 percent, and even 35 percent in some cases. Because of a lack of manpower and proper equipment (flat-bottom junks, space for threshing, drying, etc.) the rate of losses at the time of harvest of the floating rice now is 15-20 percent or more. In the course of rural planning and reconstruction for farmers in the floating rice-growing zone, we must pay attention to the requirements of rice harvest.

Although floating rice production offers low crop yield and is uncertain, labor productivity is quite high (production of 1 quintal of floating rice requires only 2-3.5 man-days). The area of floating rice growing is large but it is located in the sparsely-populated areas where the degree of civilization is far from equal to that of other places and the means of communications and liaison are difficult. In the time to come, we must seek a better and more comprehensive understanding of the floating rice-growing zone, mostly in connection with its topography, climate, hydrography in smaller areas, and the floating rice plant itself, particularly in terms of seed resources and major characteristics of good varieties. The floating rice-growing zone, with floating rice being its major crop, will undergo new changes and support better the local population while providing many surpluses of agricultural products to be supplied to other zones.

AGRICULTURE

WINTER-SPRING RICE YIELD SHOWS NATIONWIDE INCREASE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Jul 82 p 1

[VNA News Release: "Nationwide Winter-Spring Rice Crop Yield Reaches 27.8 Quintals/Hectare, An Increase of 2.33 Quintals/Hectare; Area and Output of Subsidiary Food Crops Both Show A Decrease As Compared With 1981"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the winter-spring season, the country as a whole has been mobilizing all of its manpower, resources, materials, capital, etc. and at the same time actively overcoming difficulties caused by natural calamities and harmful insects and has planted 3.21 million hectares of crops of all kinds, equal to 97.4 percent of the 1981 figure, with grain crop accounting for 2.246 million hectares, or 89 percent of the plan goal and 95.8 percent of the 1981 figure; winter-spring rice crop alone accounting on a nationwide basis for 1.615 million hectares, or 97.4 percent of the plan goal and 98.6 percent of the winter-spring season last year, with 1.58 million hectares in the North and 557,000 hectares in the South.

Although the cultivated area was less than last year (24,000 hectares less), the fact that more stable manure and nitrate fertilizer (3 quintals more of the former and 6 kilograms more of the latter per hectare) were applied to rice plants, the late-transplanted rice plants encountered favorable weather and at the same time the form of product contracts with laborers was widely applied has favorably affected the intensive cultivation of crops. The nationwide rice crop yield has reached 27.8 quintals per hectare, an increase of 2.33 quintals per hectare over the 1981 winter-spring crop.

In the North, the fifth-month and spring rice crop was quite good, with the average yield reaching 25.54 quintals per hectare, an increase of 2.21 quintals per hectare over the 1981 same crop. High yields were registered in many provinces: Thai Binh 37.42 quintals per hectare, Hai Hung 34.44, Ha Nam Ninh 30 and Haiphong 28.82. The Region 4 provinces obtained from 20.47 to 24 quintals per hectare. Binh Tri Thien had 63 cooperatives having obtained a rice crop yield of over 30 quintals per hectare and 5 districts having surpassed the yields and outputs set in their plans. Vinh Phu Province this season obtained a lower yield than last year.

As compared with 1981, the nationwide winter-spring rice output increased by 304,900 tons, with an increase of 228,900 tons in the North and 76,000 tons in the South.

While the winter-spring rice crop has scored a great victory, the cultivated area of subsidiary food crops showed a decrease -- only 76 percent of the plan goal and 90.5 percent of the 1981 figure. Of this cultivated area only corn reached 92.5 percent of the plan goal, equal to 94.7 percent of the 1981 figure; sweet potato and manioc, only 73-75 percent, and other subsidiary food crops even lower; the total output of subsidiary food crops converted to paddy equivalent was 1.26 million tons, equal to 85 percent of the 1981 figure and a decrease of 125,600 tons.

The winter-spring season this year, however, has reached an output of only 5.504 million tons; as the need and grain production plan demand, the country as a whole must struggle very hard to continue to score victory in the summer-autumn and tenth-month seasons. According to statistical data gathered in several years, it would be difficult to achieve the plan goals in terms of autumn and tenth-month rice output; while the subsidiary food crop output converted to paddy equivalent would be negligible in the autumn and tenth-month seasons, many localities have taken and are taking positive measures, such as mobilizing materials, fertilizers, insecticide, etc., in the key rice-growing zones; at the same time, the combined strength of the state and people is being mobilized for stepping up production and, as an immediate step, properly caring for the summer-autumn rice and planting in time the tenth-month season crops.

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AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL URGES ATTENTION TO IRRIGATION IN PRODUCT CONTRACTING

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Jul 82 pp 1,4

[Editorial: "Organize Irrigation in Product Contracting"]

[Text] The results of each production season and the quantity of products harvested per unit of area are yardsticks for accurately measuring the technical measures that are applied, the foremost of which is irrigation. The irrigation and drainage of paddies directly create conditions for the development of plants and for improving the effectiveness of the land and the other technical measures in production. Therefore, the irrigation installations and the use of water in the fields must be well managed and scientifically organized in order to attain high effectiveness in many regards.

After the establishment of new production relationships in agriculture a division of labor was carried out within the cooperatives. The management and use of water began to be organized in the form of irrigation teams or units under the direction of the management boards. After many years of operation those organizations have, in general, contributed importantly to developing production and consolidating the new production relationships in agriculture. The cooperatives that produce well have active irrigation units which bring about clear results. Exemplary in that regard are such cooperatives as Nguyen Xa (Dong Hung District, Thai Binh Province), Hoang Anh (Hoang Hoa District, Thanh Hoa Province), Cam Dinh (Cam Binh District, Hai Hung Province), Phu Dong (Hanoi), etc. The good operation of the irrigation units have helped the cooperatives guard against and fight waterlogging and drought, to plant their entire area on schedule, and to improve the quality of irrigation in accordance with scientific methods. The cooperatives with good irrigation units are able to apply rational irrigation methods and enhance the effect of the other technical measures. At the same time, they save a considerable amount of money in expenditures for irrigation water and for oil and electricity to operate pumping machines, do a good job of protecting the irrigation installations, rapidly and effectively recover irrigation costs, lower production costs, reduce the state deficit, and advance to balancing income and expenditures.

Since the implementation of product contracting, in addition to the cooperatives which have maintained and developed their irrigation management organizations there are many which have not promptly made appropriate arrangements to facilitate the operations of the irrigation units under the conditions of the new management structure. That situation has led to a number of negative phenomena. The management boards have relaxed their leadership. Irrigation units exist in form only and

do not actually function. Unit members abandon irrigation work to work the land contracted out to their family. Some places have disbanded the irrigation units, retaining only one person to handle relations between the irrigation cluster and the cooperative. Plans for the use of water by the production units and cooperative member families who produce on a contracted-out basis are not implemented by specialized organizations, which results in competition for water and canals, in damage to sluice gates, and to the waste of electricity and water, and directly creates difficulties for production.

Many cooperatives have begun to see many deficiencies caused by their relaxation of irrigation and are restoring the irrigation management organizations under the new contracting-out conditions and have correctly affirm the necessary role of the irrigation organizations in the cooperative.

They are an intermediate link that is indispensable in retaining the relationship between the cooperative and the state water management organ, most directly with lowest echelon, the irrigation cluster. Furthermore, the irrigation units also perform the "centipede feet" function of the irrigation management system. Even if it operates well and has good methods, the state management system lacks the base-level organization of the irrigation unit and cannot be fully effective, and the irrigation policies and measures sent down by the upper echelon cannot be meticulously implemented.

Depending on the production situation and characteristics of each place, the localities and bases must organize appropriate irrigation management forms. At present, the cooperatives in the north are organizing units to manage irrigation within the sphere of the cooperative. The Trung Bo provinces have agricultural protection teams, in the Nam Bo provinces there are water conduit teams, etc. The base-level irrigation forms, no matter what the form, must assume responsibility for two basic missions: irrigating the fields for which they are responsible and serving as the "centipede feet" of the state irrigation management system and implementing the policies and measures sent down by the upper echelon.

The irrigation management organizations at the production bases must be on a permanent basis and gradually improved with regard to both the form of organization and the operational contents, as well as the development rate of the production capability and the new production relations. They must continually advance to performing tasks, from simple to complicated and from low-level to high-level, in accordance with their stipulated functions. At first, they assume responsibility for preventing and fighting waterlogging and droughts and ensure sufficient water for production, and gradually advance to the attainment of rational, scientific irrigation. They maintain and carry out minor repairs on the cooperative irrigation systems and the portions of state irrigation installations within the sphere of the locality. Those missions require the people in the base-level management organizations to ensure a number of basic conditions. First of all, they must have a strong sense of responsibility and not fear hardships. They must be capable of assimilating the irrigation science and technology stipulated for their organization. They must understand the basic regarding the cultivation of crops grown on their land, and grasp the production schedule of the base in order to closely combine it with the irrigation regulations in accordance with the requirements of each

developmental phase of the crop. Short-term on-the-job training should be carried out annually before each production season so that all members of the irrigation team can do their jobs well.

The method of contracting out final output to groups of workers and individual workers must be applied extensively. The experience of many places demonstrates that the irrigation organizations of the cooperatives must be consolidated and have better operational conditions in the new contracting-out structure.

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CSO: 4209/428

AGRICULTURE

BRIEFS

NGHIA BINH SUMMER-FALL RICE--To date 47,000 hectares of summer-fall rice in Nghia Binh Province are growing ears. Some districts have begun harvesting and in the first 10 days of July they collected more than 1,000 hectares. The province is supervising agricultural cooperatives to accelerate their harvest work to ensure a quick delivery of grain to state granaries. [BK260651 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 16 Jul 82 BK]

DAC LAC GRAIN OBLIGATION--During the first 6 months of this year people of various nationalities in Dac Lac Province delivered and sold to state at agreed-upon price more than 10,000 tons of grain. Despite heavy rainfall during the recent winter-spring crop, the local peasants and people promptly harvested their crop and delivered grain to state granaries according to schedule. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 16 Jul 82 BK] Since early this year Dac Lac Province has received more than 4,500 families of 24,800 persons from various provinces for resettlement in various new economic zones. The province has provided help and supplied these people with equipment and materials to enable them to soon embark on production and stabilize their daily life. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 21 Jul 82 BK]

DONG NAI CULTIVATED LAND--Dong Nai Province recently distributed 17,630 hectares of land to families of the fallen heroes who have no land for cultivation. The province also encourages these people to participate in production solidarity teams, production collectives and cooperatives. Various agricultural committees in the province have closely supervised collective units and these families to manage and fully exploit their arable land. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 13 Jul 82 BK]

LONG AN GRAIN OBLIGATION--To date Long An Province has collected more than 21,700 tons of tax grain for the 10th-month and winter-spring rice crops, achieving more than 60 percent of plan norm or 2,500 tons more than the same period last year. Tan An City, Can Duoc, Duc Hoa and Tan Thanh districts have fulfilled their agricultural tax collection according to schedule. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 21 Jul 82 BK]

BEN TRE SUMMER-FALL RICE--As of late June, Ben Tre Province had plowed more than 40,000 hectares of land and planted more than 25,000 hectares of summer-fall and early 10th-month rice. Mo Cay, Cho Lach and Chau Thanh districts have planted 60-70 percent of their planned areas. The province is supervising peasants in caring for their ricefields in order to obtain a yield of 29 quintals of paddy per hectare. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 15 Jul 82 SK] Since early this year, Ben Tre Province had delivered to state granaries almost 14,000 tons of grain, achieving 45 percent of its plan norm. Thanh Phu and Ba Tri districts took the lead in this task achieving almost 90 percent of their plan norms. The provincial people's committee has taken a number of measures to encourage peasants and the people to accelerate their grain obligation task. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 16 Jul 82 BK]

KIEN GIANG PRODUCTION COLLECTIVES--During the summer-fall and 10th-month crops this year, Kien Giang Province consolidated 566 old production collectives and improved 296 newly established collectives. Some 525 cooperatives and production collectives in the province have applied the product-based contractual system. The province has also assigned cadres to various localities to supervise the application of the new contractual system. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 15 Jul 82 BK]

NETHERLANDS EXPERTS--Under the sponsorship of the Can Tho University, two Dutch experts recently went to Dong Thap Muoi to study the alkaline soil in this area. The study is aimed at helping the Vietnamese peasants to fully exploit alkaline soil in agricultural production. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 22 Jul 82 BK]

LANG SON 10TH-MONTH RICE--To date Lang Son Province had planted more than 8,000 hectares of 10th-month rice, achieving 24.3 percent of its plan norm. Three border districts of Cao Loc, Trang Dinh and Loc Binh took the lead in the planting work achieving 40 percent of their planned areas. [BK260641 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 2300 GMT 16 Jul 82 BK]

THANH HOA GRAIN OBLIGATION--As of 14 July, Thanh Hoa Province had delivered to state granaries 80,587 tons of grain converted to paddy equivalent, overfulfilling the 5th-month spring crop plan norm by 12 percent. Thieu Yen, Dong Thieu and Tho Xuan districts have each delivered to state 10,000 tons of grain. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0400 GMT 19 Jul 82 BK]

BINH TRI THIEN 5TH-MONTH SPRING RICE--As of 11 July, Binh Tri Thien Province had overfulfilled its 5th-month spring rice plan norm by 350 tons. This is the first time since 1976 that the province has overfulfilled its grain obligation. The province's output this year is 16,000 tons more than the same period last year. It has also sold to state more than 11,000 tons of grain at agreed-upon price. [Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1430 GMT 15 Jul 82 BK]

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CHRONOLOGY

HANOI'S CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS FROM 16 APR-15 MAY 1982

Hanoi VIETNAM COURIER in English Vol 18, No 6, 1982 p 32

[Text]

APRIL

16. Vietnam is elected to the UN Committee to examine discrimination against women.

17. At the Spring session of the Interparliamentarian Union held in Lagos (Nigeria) from April 12 to 17, the Vietnamese delegation rejects US slanders against Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

18. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach pays a visit to the German Democratic Republic from April 16 to 18.

19. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach visits the Belgian Kingdom and the headquarters of the European Economic Community.

— Signing in Hanoi of an agreement on long-term cultural co-operation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

— A Vietnamese Ministry of Culture and Information delegation, headed by Minister Nguyen Van Hieu, pays a friendship visit to Kampuchea.

20. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach pays a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany at the invitation of the FRG Foreign Ministry.

— A delegation of the USSR State Committee for Prices headed by its chairman N.T. Glushkov visits Vietnam.

21. In response to the International Year for the Protection of the Environment, the Vietnam Committee for "World Environment Day" holds a seminar on environment and health. 18 papers are presented.

22. A high-level military delegation of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia, led by Defence Minister, General Martin Dzur, pays an official friendship visit to Vietnam from April 22 to 26.

23. Vietnam participates in the Economic and Technological Creativeness Exhibition of youth in Moscow.

24. The Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian People sends a message expressing solidarity and support on the occasion of the Week of Solidarity with Palestinian political prisoners.

25. The Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam decides to confer the Ho Chi Minh Order on I.V. Arkhipov, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, first Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, on the occasion of his 75th birthday.

26. A delegation of Vietnamese officials in charge of information and cultural relations with foreign countries visits Japan from April 10 to 26.

27. A delegation of the Council for Research on Productive Forces of the USSR State Commission for Sciences pays a visit to Vietnam from April 13 to 27.

29. A high-level delegation of the Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua (FSLN), headed by Revolutionary Commander Victor Manuel Tirado Lopez, member of the FSLN National Leadership, visits Vietnam.

— Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach ends his official visit to India begun on April 25.

MAY

2. The Ministry of Culture and Information opens its first course on economic management for cadres of the ministry.

3. Vietnam enters more than 300 items for the Plovdiv International Spring Fair.

4. A spokesman for the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry issues a statement condemning the armed aggression against the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Argentina by British authorities.

— A delegation of the Communist Party of Vietnam, headed by Truong-Chinh, member of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee, President of the Council of State, attended the Third Congress of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party from April 25 to May 4.

5. To serve offshore oil and gas exploration in Vietnam, a delegation of the USSR Insurance Company, led by I.G. Sekerz, deputy director-general, visits Vietnam.

— The Swedish National Assembly agrees to a proposal of the Swedish Government to give Vietnam emergency aid to the value of 345 million *kronor* for the 1982-1983 fiscal year.

6. A detachment of the Indian Navy under the command of Rear Admiral Sukhman Jain, Flag Ship Officer of the Eastern Fleet, pays an official visit to Vietnam.

— An economic delegation of the Communist Party of Cuba, headed by Lionel Soto Prieto, secretary of the Party Central Committee, paid a visit to Vietnam from April 24 to May 6.

— Signing in Hanoi of a protocol on communications and transport between Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic for 1982.

11. Founding of the Vietnam Committee for the International Year of the Elderly with Nguyen Huu Tho as its chairman.

13. The Vietnamese Council of State confers the Vietnam's Sao Vang (Gold Star) Order on N.A. Tikhonov, Political Bureau member of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

14. A Vietnamese traditional music ensemble attends the first Vietnam-Laos-Kampuchea traditional music and dance festival in Phnom Penh.

15. A "Women's Festival" is opened at the Giang Vo Exhibition Centre showing the achievements of Vietnamese women in national construction and defence.

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END